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ABSTRACT
Participation is a concept that is being used in a wide variety of fields, and that has obtained an evenly large range of meanings. This 
article attempts first to ground participation in democratic theory, which allows introducing the distinction between minimalist 
and maximalist forms of participation. In the second part of the article, a broad definition of the politics will be used to transcend 
to logics of institutionalized politics, and to emphasize that the distribution of power in society is a dimension of the social that 
permeates every possible societal field. Both discussions are then used to describe the key characteristics of participation, and to 
increase the concept’s theoretical foundation. The article then zooms in on one of these characteristics, namely the difference between 
access, interaction and participation, as this distinction allows further sharpening the key meanings attributed to participation 
as a political process where the actors involved in decision-making processes are positioned towards each other through power 
relationships that are (to an extent) egalitarian.
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RESUMO
Participação é um conceito que tem sido utilizado em uma ampla variedade de áreas e que obteve uma gama ainda maior de significados. 
Esse artigo tenta, primeiramente debater participação na teoria democrática, o que nos permite introduzir a distinção entre formas 
minimalistas e maximalistas de participação. Na segunda paete, uma definição mais ampla de política é utilizada para transcender 
para as lógicas das políticas institucionalizadas e para enfatizar que a distribuição de poder na sociedade é uma dimensão do social 
que permeia todo campo possível da sociedade. Ambas as discussões são então utilizadas para descrever as características chave de 
participação, e para ampliar a fundamentalção teórica do conceito. O artigo então prossegue enfocando cada uma dessas características, 
nomeadamente a diferença entre acesso, interação e participação, uma vez que essa distinção nos permite delimitar mais afinadamente 
os significados chave atribuidos à participação enquanto um processo político no qual os atores envolvidos nos processos de tomada 
de decisão estão posicionados em direção ao outro através de relações de poder que são (em um certo sentido) igualitárias.
Plavras-chave: Teoria da participação, teoria democrática, política, poder, acesso, interação, contingência.
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Introduction
Participation has (again) become one of the key 
concepts of communication and media studies, especially 
after the popularization of web 2.0. At the same time, the 
concept of participation has a long history, where especial-
ly in the 1960s and 1970s the debates about participation 
were omnipresent in a wide variety of societal fields. This 
has caused this concept to feature in a surprising variety 
of frameworks, which have been transformed through an 
almost infinite number of materializations.
But the problems that characterize (the use of ) 
participation have not disappeared, on the contrary. Al-
ready in 1970, Pateman wrote (1970, p. 1) “the widespread 
use of the term […] has tended to mean that any precise, 
meaningful content has almost disappeared; ‘participation’ 
is used to refer to a wide variety of different situations 
by different people”, and this situation has not altered. 
In communication and media studies, but also in many 
other fields and disciplines, participation is still used to 
mean everything and nothing, remains structurally under-
theorized and its intrinsically political nature –as part of a 
democratic-ideological struggle on the democratic nature 
of democracy- remains unacknowledged.
By returning to democratic theory, this article 
aims to firmly ground participation in democratic theory, 
in order to show the importance of power in defining 
the concept of participation. At the same time we need 
to transcend the realm of institutionalized politics, as 
democracy and participation cannot be restricted to this 
realm but need to be seen as transecting all realms of 
society. By revisiting these theoretical debates, a series of 
key characteristics of participation can be developed, in 
combination with a model that explicates the differences 
between access, interaction and participation.
Back to democratic theory
Democracy, because of its concern with the inclu-
sion of people within political decision-making processes, 
is one of the key sites of the articulation of the concept of 
participation. The centrality of people’s participation is 
described in Held’s (1996, p. 1) definition of democracy 
as “a form of government in which, in contradiction to 
monarchies and aristocracies, the people rule. Democracy 
entails a political community in which there is some form 
of political equality among the people”. Held’s work pro-
vides an immediate and excellent overview of the complex-
ity of the notion of democracy. In his Models of Democracy, 
Held (1996, p. 3) initiates the debate by referring to Lively’s 
(1975, p. 30) list of ways to organize this form of political 
equality in practice. Lively distinguishes seven variations: 
(i) all should govern; (ii) all should be involved in crucial 
decision-making; (iii) rulers should be accountable to the 
ruled; (iv) rulers should be accountable to the representa-
tives of the ruled; (v) rulers should be chosen by the ruled; 
(vi) rulers should be chosen by the representatives of the 
ruled and (vii) rulers should act in the interest of the ruled. 
This list first highlights the strong emphasis in democratic 
theory on the difference between rulers and ruled, with the 
important consequence that the concept of participation is 
articulated exclusively in relation to the ruled, ignoring the 
rulers. The list can also be seen as an initial indication that 
democracy is not a stable concept with a fixed signification, 
but encompasses a multitude of meanings.
The meaning of the concept of democracy is 
complicated by three elements: the variety of democratic 
manifestations and variants, the distinction between for-
mal democracy and democratic cultures and practices, 
and the distinction between the narrow-political system 
(‘politics’) and the broad-political dimensions of the social 
(the ‘political’). One of the crucial dimensions structuring 
the different democratic models is the minimalist versus 
maximalist dimension, which underlies a number of key 
positions in the articulation of democracy. 
In this regard, a key theme has been the always-
present balance between representation and participation, 
which, for instance, provides structuring support for Held’s 
(1996) typology of democratic models. As Held describes 
it, “Within the history of the clash of positions lies the 
struggle to determine whether democracy will mean some 
kind of popular power (a form of life in which citizens are 
engaged in self-government and self-regulation) or an aid 
to decision-making (a means to legitimate the decisions of 
those voted into power)” (Held, 1996, p. 3 – emphasis in 
original). The notion of representation refers here to polit-
ical representation, Vertretung, or speaking-for, in contrast 
to the other main meaning of representation, Darstel-
lung, or standing-for (Spivak, 1990, p. 108).3 Political 
3 In this interview, Spivak refers to the etymology of Vertretung (“to thread into someone’s shoes”), but also emphasizes the differences 
and interconnections between the notions of Vertretung and Darstellung, which she also refers to her 1988 essay Can the Subaltern Speak?.
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representation is grounded in the formal delegation of 
power, where specific actors are authorized on behalf of 
others “to sign on his behalf, to act on his behalf, to speak 
on his behalf ” and where these actors receive “the power 
of a proxy” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 203). Obviously, one of the 
basic democratic instruments for the formal delegation 
of power is elections, where, through the organization of 
a popular vote, political actors are legitimized to gain (at 
least partial) control over well-defined parts of the state’s 
resources and decision-making structures. This control is 
not total, but structured through institutional, legal (often 
constitutional) and cultural logics. 
On the other side of the democratic balance is 
the notion of participation, which refers to the involve-
ment of the citizenry within (institutionalized) politics. 
As Marshall (1992, p. 10-11) explains in his discussion 
of political citizen rights, this not only includes the right 
to elect, but also the right to stand for election: “By the 
political element [of citizenship] I mean the right to par-
ticipate in the exercise of political power, as a member of 
a body invested with political power or as an elector of 
such a body”. Again, these forms of political participation 
are not total, but structured through institutional, legal 
and cultural logics (see Dahlgren, 2009). One important 
example is the limits imposed by the concept of citizenship 
itself, which is not only a democracy-facilitating concept, 
but also has an exclusionary component.
Different democratic models (of democratic theory 
and practice) attribute different balances between these 
concepts of representation and participation. When the 
political is defined, following Schumpeter (1976), for 
instance, as the privilege of specific competing elites, thus 
reducing the political role of the citizenry to participation 
in the election process, the balance shifts towards repre-
sentation and the delegation of power. In this minimalist 
model, the societal decision-making remains centralized 
and participation remains limited (in space and time). 
In contrast, in other democratic models (e.g., participatory 
or radical democracy – see below), participation plays a 
more substantial and continuous role and does not remain 
restricted to the ‘mere’ election of representatives. These 
democratic models with more decentralized societal 
decision-making and a stronger role of participation 
(in relation to representation) are considered here to be 
maximalist forms of democratic participation.
Maximalist versions of 
participation in democratic 
theory
Although the field of democratic theory is exten-
sive, and characterized by an almost unsettling degree of 
diversity, I want to focus in this part on the democratic 
models that share a strong(er) commitment to maximal-
ist democratic participation. These models each show 
the intimate connection between participation, power 
and decision-making processes, in a variety of different 
articulations. At the same time, this overview also shows 
the development of participatory thought over time, and 
the way this has contributed to their articulatory diversity. 
A more practical implication of this diversity is 
that in this part only a selection of models is discussed, 
a decision that inevitably leads to the exclusion of some 
other, still relevant, models (such as Giddens’s (1998, p. 
113-117) model of dialogical democracy4). The models 
I briefly discuss here are Marxism, anarchism, the New 
Left models of participatory democracy, deliberative de-
mocracy and radical democracy, which I deem to be the 
most representative models showing the workings of the 
more maximalist participatory articulations. 
Marxist theory takes a strong emancipatory 
position that is embedded in a critique of the bourgeois 
domination of society. Marx nevertheless foresaw a 
structural change, through a series of class conflicts and 
revolutionary struggles, fed by logics internal to capitalism, 
establishing a communist society. Despite its inevitability, 
Marx did not envisage this change as being immediate: 
He distinguished two stages in the development of com-
munism. In the first and transitional stage (later referred 
to as socialism by Lenin), most productive property would 
become collectively owned, but some class differences 
would persist, because society would “still [be] stamped 
with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb 
it emerges” (Marx, 1994, p. 315). In practice this meant 
that the worker (in this transitional phase) would receive 
“[t]he same amount of labour which he has given to 
society in one form, [...] back in another”. In this transi-
tional phase the state needed to be democratized through 
what Marx calls the revolutionary dictatorship of the 
4 The reason for excluding this model is that it can be seen as a hybrid combination of deliberative and radical democracy, both of 
which are discussed in this chapter.
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proletariat.5 In The Civil War in France, Marx expands 
on the blueprint provided by the Paris Commune and 
develops it to extend to the national level. This national 
Commune model was based on a council structure6 and 
delegation to higher decision-making levels (Marx, 1993). 
The pyramid structure of the model of direct (or delega-
tive) democracy (Held, 1996, p. 145-146) allows for (and 
requires) high levels of participation, through the selection 
of and subsequent actions of delegates, which would create 
a more horizontal set of power relations. But not until the 
second phase would society have completely transcended 
capitalism, and would “the enslaving subordination of the 
individual to the division of labour, and therewith also the 
antithesis between mental and physical labour [have...] 
vanished” (Marx, 1994, p. 321). For Marx, communist 
society is constructed on the basis of a new conception 
of the self, which is highly altruistic and non-conflictual: 
For instance, labour is performed to please the others, 
and not out of a sense of duty. In this utopian situation, 
the need for repressive state apparatuses would also have 
disappeared, and only a series of basic coordination, purely 
administrative tasks would require elected coordinators. 
This “labour of supervision and management” (Marx, 
1992, p. 507) could be compared to the role of the con-
ductor of an orchestra, as Marx (1992, p. 507) writes in 
Capital. Through the logics of cooperation, participation 
would become maximized in the egalitarian communist 
society. This implied the disappearance of the principle of 
power delegation, as participation was organized through 
everyday life. 
Frequently ignored in debates on maximalist 
versions of participatory democracy is (the legacy of ) 
anarchist theory (cf. May, 1994). Arguably, this neglect 
does justice to neither anarchist nor democratic theory. 
Anarchism’s emphasis on decentralization and local 
autonomy led to a strong emphasis on participation 
within what Godwin (1971) called ‘parishes’ or voluntary 
federations. The distrust of government and rejection of 
(political) representation, that characterize anarchism, 
are fed by a discourse of anti-authoritarism, which resists 
the establishment of societal hierarchies and systems of 
domination and privilege (Bookchin, 1996, p. 29). Illustra-
tive of this is Bakunin’s (1970, p. 31) statement, “It is the 
characteristic of privilege and of every privileged position 
to kill the mind and heart of men”. This immediately 
brings us to the anarchist theory’s strong emphasis on 
maximalist participation and decentralization as principles 
of decision-making. As Jennings (1999, p. 138) formulates 
it, there is a “generalised preference for decentralisation, 
autonomy and mass participation in the decision-making 
process”. Through the free and equal participation of 
all in a variety of societal spheres, government as such 
becomes unnecessary, and an equal power balance in 
these decision-making processes can be achieved, which, 
in turn, maximize individual autonomy within a context 
of societal heterogeneity. Similarly, within the economic 
realm, the principle of capitalist struggle is replaced by a 
decentralized gift economy.
The New Left conceptualizations of participatory 
democracy – developed by Pateman (1970, 1985) and 
Macpherson (1966, 1973, 1977) and later by Mansbridge 
(1980) and Barber (1984) – focus on the combination of 
the principles and practices of direct and representative 
democracy. The problems of coordination in large-scale 
industrial societies bring the latter to accept representa-
tion (and power delegation) as a necessary tool at the 
level of national decision-making. At the same time 
Pateman (1970, p. 1) critiques authors such as Schum-
peter (1976), for attributing “the most minimal role” 
to participation, and for basing their arguments on a 
fear that the implementation of more developed forms 
of participation might jeopardize society’s stability. 
This induces Pateman and Macpherson to introduce 
a broad-political approach to participation, which can 
be found in Pateman’s seminal definitions of partial 
participation as “a process in which two or more parties 
influence each other in the making of decisions but the 
final power to decide rests with one party only” (Pate-
man, 1970, p. 70), and full participation as “a process 
where each individual member of a decision-making 
body has equal power to determine the outcome of 
decisions” (Pateman, 1970, p. 71). This broad-political 
perspective also brings Pateman (1970, p. 110) to look 
at what she calls “alternative areas”, in order to maximize 
participation. It is only through participation in these 
‘alternative areas’ of the political that a citizen can “hope 
to have any real control over the course of his life or 
the development of the environment in which he lives” 
(Pateman, 1970, p. 110). This expansion of participation 
into these ‘alternative areas’ is deemed a necessity, since 
“for a democratic polity to exist it is necessary for a par-
ticipatory society to exist, i.e. a society where all political 
5 The dictatorship of proletariat should not be confused with the Leninist notion of dictatorship of the vanguard of the proletariat.
6 Some authors, like Gramsci, related the council to the soviet (Bottomore, 1991, p. 114).
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systems have been democratized […]” (Pateman, 1970, 
p. 43). For Pateman, this also implies a broadening of 
the concept of politics: When discussing participation 
in the industry, she explicitly defines these realms of the 
social as “political systems in their own right” (Pateman, 
1970, p. 43). In Participation and Democratic Theory, 
Pateman (1970) focuses on participation in one specific 
‘alternative area’: industry. Macpherson’s (1977) work 
takes a different angle: He describes the (first) model 
of participatory democracy, which he develops in The 
Life and Times of Liberal Democracy, as follows: “One 
would start with direct democracy at the neighbour-
hood or factory level – actual face-to-face discussion 
and decision by consensus or majority, and election of 
delegates who would make up a council at the next more 
inclusive level, say a city borough or ward or a township. 
[…] So it would go up to the top level, which would 
be a national council for matters of national concern, 
and local and regional councils for matters of less than 
national concern” (Macpherson’s, 1977, p. 108). At the 
same time, Macpherson (1980, p. 28) acknowledges that 
“[t]he prospects of a participatory pluralist system […] 
appear rather slight” and investigates how some of the 
principles of participatory democracy can be reconciled 
with (and supported by) a competitive party system. 
Macpherson is suggesting the reorganization of the party 
system on less hierarchical principles, which would in-
crease organizational democracy within political parties, 
rendering them “genuinely participatory parties [that] 
could operate through a parliamentary or congressional 
structure” (Macpherson, 1977, p. 114).
The model of deliberative democracy also tries to 
(re)balance the participatory and representative aspects 
of democracy, but, here, the participatory moment is lo-
cated in communication, as deliberative democracy refers 
to “decision making by discussion among free and equal 
citizens” (Elster, 1998, p. 1, emphasis added). Elster (1998, 
p. 8) points to the two main characteristics of this model: 
Its democratic nature is ensured because of its focus on 
“collective decision making with the participation of all 
who will be affected by the decision or their represen-
tatives”, and its deliberative nature lies in the focus on 
“decision making by means of arguments offered by and 
to participants who are committed to values or rationality 
and impartiality” (emphasis in original). Habermas’s work 
is one of the main sources of inspiration for the model of 
deliberative democracy.7 His older work on communica-
tive rationality and the public sphere plays a key role in 
grounding deliberation in the intersubjective structures of 
communication, where the “speakers’ orientation toward 
mutual understanding entails a commitment to certain 
presuppositions rooted in the idea of unconstrained argu-
mentation or discourse” (Flynn, 2004, p. 436). In Between 
Facts and Norms, Habermas (1996) further develops his 
model of deliberative democracy (and its relationship 
to law). In the Habermasian model of deliberative de-
mocracy, participation is multidirectional because of the 
strong emphasis on the procedural-deliberative, and on 
the role that institutions play in the transformation of 
public opinion into communicative power. In his two-
track model of deliberative politics, the public sphere 
becomes a “warning system with sensors that, though 
unspecified, are sensitive throughout society” (Habermas, 
1996, p. 359) and that can problematize issues, while 
deliberative procedures in the formal decision-making 
sphere focus on cooperative solutions to (these) societal 
problems, without aiming for ethical consensus.8
Laclau and Mouffe (1985), aiming to de-essen-
tialize Althusser’s and Gramsci’s work (and thus, also, the 
work of Marx and Engels),9 developed a post-Marxist 
democratic model. Their work parallels the work on the 
deliberative model, but was developed differently because 
it was inspired by a post-structuralist agenda. They con-
sidered their democratic project to be radically pluralist 
because of its embeddedness in a social ontology, which 
emphasized that “subject positions cannot be led back to 
a positive and unitary founding principle” (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985, p. 167). This implies also that the radical 
pluralist democracy advocated by Laclau and Mouffe was 
not radical in the sense of identifying ‘the true and pure 
democratic model’: “Its radical character implies, on the 
contrary, that we can save democracy only by taking into 
account its radical impossibility” (Žižek, 1989, p. 6). For 
this reason, Mouffe (1997, p. 8) refers to radical pluralist 
democracy as a democracy that will always be ‘to come’. 
Nevertheless, the radical pluralist democratic model also 
7 Of course, Habermas is not the only author in this debate. See Cohen (1989), Fishkin (1991) and Dryzek (2000). The deliberative 
democratic model was also supported by Rawls (1999, p. 139), who in 1999 declared that he was “concerned with a well-ordered 
constitutional democracy [...] understood also as a deliberative democracy”.
8 For instance, Mouffe (2005) continues to criticize Habermas for his focus on consensual outcomes.
9 See Carpentier and Spinoy (2008). This part is mainly based on the introductory chapter of this book.
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contains a plea to balance power relations in society. 
In particular, Laclau and Mouffe want to “broaden the 
domain of the exercise of democratic rights beyond the 
limited traditional field of ‘citizenship’”, claiming that 
the distinctions between public/private and civil society/
political society are “only the result of a certain type of 
hegemonic articulation” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 
185). Again, we can identify a call to extend the political 
into the realm of the economy, where the importance of 
the “anti-capitalist struggle” (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, 
p. 185) is emphasized. But through Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(1985, p. 176) emphasis on the plurality and heterogeneity 
of the social, the broad definition of the political and “the 
extension of the field of democracy to the whole of civil so-
ciety and the state”, also the notion of participation moves 
to the foreground. Although the concept of participation 
is used only rarely, its importance becomes clear in Laclau 
and Mouffe’s critique on the “anti-democratic offensive” 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 171) in neo-conservative 
discourses. These neo-conservative discourses are seen as 
the antipode of their radical democratic model because 
they want to “redefine the notion of democracy itself in 
such a way as to restrict its field of application and limit 
political participation to an even narrower area” (Laclau 
and Mouffe, 1985, p. 173). Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 
173) continue by stating that these discourses would “serve 
to legitimize a regime in which political participation 
might be virtually non-existent”. The increased level of 
(political) participation that radical pluralist democracy 
has to offer is still delineated by the need to “agree on 
the liberal-democratic rules of the game”, although this 
is not taken to mean that “the precise interpretation of 
the rules of the game” would be given once and for all 
(Torfing, 1999, p. 261; Mouffe, 1995, p. 502). In Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 176) 
state explicitly that the contemporary liberal-democratic 
ideology should not be renounced, but rather reworked 
in the direction of a radical and plural democracy, which 
generates sufficient openness for a plurality of forms 
and variations of democracy, which correspond to the 
multiplicity of subject positions active in the social. It is 
at this level also – combined with their dealing with “a 
very different theoretical problematic” – that Laclau and 
Mouffe (1985, p. 194) explicitly distinguish their posi-
tion from the work of Macpherson and Pateman, who 
they see as defending a too specific and too well-aligned 
democratic model. But Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p. 
194) add that they “nevertheless share [with them] many 
important concerns”.
Beyond democratic theory
In late (or post) modern societies, the frontiers 
of institutionalized politics have also become permeable. 
Discussions within the field of democratic theory, as 
exemplified in the previous part of this article, indicate 
that it would be difficult to confine the political (and the 
logic of power and decision-making in society) to the 
realm of institutionalized politics. Democratic theory 
has (sometimes) incorporated such transformations, but 
these theoretical expansions did not develop in a void. 
They grew out of a diversity of political practices that 
originated from actors that often were (strictly speaking) 
situated outside the realm of institutionalized politics. 
Whether they are called interest groups, old/new social 
movements, civil society or activists, these actors broad-
ened the scope of the political and made participation 
more heterogeneous and multidirectional.
In some cases these political practices were still 
aimed at impacting directly on institutionalized politics, 
but in other cases their political objectives diverged 
from the ‘traditional’ and were aimed at cultural change. 
In many cases, several objectives and ‘targets’ were devel-
oped in conjunction. For instance, the feminist movement 
aimed for the re-articulation of gender relations, within a 
diversity of societal spheres, combining identity politics 
(see e.g. Harris, 2001) with (successful) attempts to affect 
legal frameworks. Not only do we witness a broadening 
of the set of actors involved in political activities, but also 
an expansion of the spheres that are considered political. 
One example here is the feminist slogan “the personal is 
political” (Hanisch, 1970), which claimed the political 
nature of social spheres such as the body and the family. 
Millett (1970), for instance, coined the term sexual poli-
tics, extending the notion of the political into the sphere of 
the private. In her chapter on the Theory of Sexual Politics, 
she introduces her sociological approach with the simple 
sentence “Patriarchy’s chief institution is the family”
(Millett, 1970, p. 33). A few pages on she, notes that 
“The chief contribution of the family in patriarchy is the 
socialisation of the young (largely through the example 
and admonition of their parents) into patriarchal ideol-
ogy’s prescribed attitudes toward the categories of role, 
temperament, and status” (Millett, 1970, p. 33).
In these feminist projects we see (a plea for) the 
political (to) move further into the social. We can apply a 
similar logic within democratic theory, since a considerable 
number of authors who tend towards the more maximal-
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ist versions of democratic participation have sought (and 
found) solutions to the scale problem in large democracies 
by reverting to civil society, the economy and the family 
as sites of political practice. Here, Mouffe’s (2000, p. 101) 
concept of the political, as the “dimension of antagonism 
that is inherent in human relations”, can be used to argue 
that the political touches upon our entire world, and can-
not be confined to institutionalized politics. Here, also, the 
difference Mouffe makes between the political and the 
social is helpful because she locates this difference in the 
sedimented nature of practices. To use her words:
The political is linked to the acts of hegemonic insti-
tution. It is in this sense that one has to differentiate 
the social from the political. The social is the realm of 
sedimented practices, that is, practices that conceal the 
originary acts of their contingent political institution 
and which are taken for granted, as if they were self-
grounded. Sedimented social practices are a constitutive 
part of any possible society; not all social bonds are put 
into question at the same time (Mouffe, 2005, p. 17).
At the same time hegemony and the taken-for-
grantedness it brings is never total or unchallengeable. 
Sedimented practices can always be questioned, problema-
tized and made political again. This is what democratic 
and social movement theorists, together with political 
activists, have attempted to do in a variety of societal fields: 
to disrupt the taken-for-grantedness of a specific social 
ordering and to show its political nature.
These logics do not apply only to the realms often 
discussed in democratic theory (such as the economy); they 
apply also to the cultural/symbolic realm and the media 
sphere, which has to be implicated in the broadening of the 
political. In other words, the representational is also political. 
The concept of the politics of representation (see e.g. Hall, 
1997, p. 257) can be used to refer to the ideological logics in 
representational processes and outcomes. Dominant and/or 
hegemonic societal orders feed into these representational 
processes and outcomes, and at the same time are legiti-
mized and normalized by their presence (or in some cases 
by meaningful absences). Organizations such as publishers 
and broadcasters – to mention but a few – act as discursive 
machinery that produces these representations, but at the 
same time they are organizational environments with spe-
cific politics, economies and cultures where, for instance, the 
politics of the expert or the professional create power relations 
that impact on the organization itself, but also on the ‘outside’ 
world and who from this ‘outside’ world is allowed in. 
This all-encompassing process of the broadening 
of the political, where all social realities become (at least 
potentially) contestable and politicized, means also that 
the notions of democracy and participation can no longer 
remain confined to the field of institutionalized politics. 
All social spheres are the potential objects of claims 
towards democratization and increased participation, 
although these claims (and the struggles provoked) do 
not lead necessarily to their realization, and the resistance 
in some societal realms turns out to be more substantial 
than in others. 
Characterizing participation
As argued in the previous part: We should 
keep in mind that the political-democratic does not 
stop at the edges of institutionalized politics. The 
political-democratic, and the distribution of power 
in society that lies at its heart, is a dimension of the 
social that permeates every possible societal field. But 
democratic theory still takes a privileged position in 
the theoretical discussion on participation, as it im-
mediately shows its political nature, and the key role 
of power in defining participation. Keeping the need 
for a broad-transectional application of participation 
in mind, we can still return to democratic theory (and 
especially to its more maximalist versions) to describe 
the key characteristics of participation, and to increase 
the concept’s theoretical foundation:
(i) The key def ining element of participation is 
power. The debates on participation in institutionalized 
politics and in all other societal fields, including media 
participation, have a lot in common in that they all focus 
on the distribution of power within society at both the 
macro- and micro-level. The balance between people’s 
inclusion in the implicit and explicit decision-making 
processes within these fields, and their exclusion through 
the delegation of power (again, implicit or explicit), is 
central to discussions on participation in all fields. Some 
prudence is called for here, as power is often reduced to 
the possession of a specific societal group. Authors such 
as Foucault (1978) have argued against this position, 
claiming that power is an always-present characteristic 
of social relations. In contemporary societies, the narra-
tions of power are complex narrations of power strategies, 
counter-powers and resistance. 
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(ii) Participation is situated in always particular 
processes and localities, and involves specif ic actors. In order 
to understand participation, and the many different 
participatory practices with their sometimes very different 
participatory intensities, the characteristics, power posi-
tions and contexts of the specific processes, localities and 
actors have to be taken into account. Participation is not 
limited to one specific societal field (e.g., ‘the’ economy) 
but is present in all societal fields and at all levels. The 
contexts that these different fields and levels bring into 
the equation, is crucial to our understanding of any par-
ticipatory process. For instance, in the theoretical debates 
on participation, we can see that at the macro-level, they 
deal with the degree to which people could and should 
be empowered to (co)decide on for instance political, 
symbolic-cultural and communicative matters. At the 
micro-level, they deal with the always-located power 
relations between privileged and non-privileged actors, 
between for instance politicians and media professionals 
on the one hand, and (ordinary) people who do not hold 
these positions on the other. Although it would be too 
much of a simplification to define all privileged actors as 
part of one societal elite, these privileged actors do form 
(partially overlapping) elite clusters, that hold stronger 
power positions compared to individuals not part of these 
elite clusters. Within all fields, debates about participation 
focus exactly on the legitimization or the questioning and 
critiquing of the power (in-) equilibrium that structures 
these social relationships. 
(iii) The concept of participation is contingent and 
itself part of the power struggles in society. The significa-
tion of participation is part of a “politics of definition” 
(Fierlbeck, 1998, p. 177), since its specific articulation 
shifts depending on the ideological framework that 
makes use of it. This implies that debates on partici-
pation are not mere academic debates, but are part of 
a political-ideological struggle for how our political 
realities are to be defined and organized. It is also not a 
mere semantic struggle, but a struggle that is lived and 
practiced. In other words, our democratic practices are, 
at least partially, structured and enabled through how 
we think participation. The definition of participation 
allows us to think, to name and to communicate the par-
ticipatory process (as minimalist or as maximalist) and 
is simultaneously constituted by our specific (minimalist 
or maximalist participatory) practices. As a consequence, 
the definition of participation is not a mere outcome of 
this political-ideological struggle, but an integrated and 
constitutive part of this struggle. 
More particularly, the definition of participation is 
one of the many societal fields where a political struggle is 
waged between the minimalist and the maximalist varia-
tions of democracy. In the minimalist model, democracy 
is confined mainly to processes of representation, and 
participation to elite selection through elections that form 
the expression of a homogeneous popular will. Participa-
tion here exclusively serves the field of institutionalized 
politics because the political is limited to this field. In the 
maximalist model, democracy is seen as a more balanced 
combination of representation and participation, where 
attempts are made to maximize participation. The political 
is considered a dimension of the social, which allows for a 
broad application of participation in many different social 
fields (including the media), at both micro- and macro-
level, and with respect for societal diversity. 
A similar logic can be used to describe minimalist 
and maximalist media participation. In (very) minimal-
ist forms, media professionals retain strong control over 
process and outcome, often restricting participation to 
mainly access and interaction; to the degree that one 
wonders whether the concept of participation is still 
appropriate. Participation remains articulated as a con-
tribution to the public sphere but often mainly serving 
the needs and interests of the mainstream media system 
itself, instrumentalizing and incorporating the activities 
of participating non-professionals. This media-centred 
logic leads to a homogenization of the audience and a 
disconnection of their participatory activities from other 
societal fields and from the broad definition of the politi-
cal, resulting in the articulation of media participation 
as non-political. In the maximalist forms, (professional) 
control and (popular) participation become more bal-
anced, and attempts are made to maximize participation. 
Here we see the acknowledgement of audience diversity 
and heterogeneity, and of the political nature of media 
participation. The maximalist articulation allows for 
recognition of the potential of media participation for 
macro-participation and its multidirectional nature.
(iv) Participation is not to be seen as part of the dem-
ocratic-populist fantasy, which is based on the replacement 
of hierarchical difference by total equality. The celebrative-
utopian variation of this fantasy defines the equalization of 
society, and the disappearance of its elites, as the ultimate 
objective for the realization of a ‘truly’ democratic society. 
In contrast, the anxietatic-dystopian variation is based on 
the fear that the democratic-populist fantasy might actu-
ally be realized. These are both populist fantasies, because 
(following Laclau’s approach to populism) they are based 
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on an antagonist resistance of the people against an elite. 
As Laclau (1977, p. 143) puts is: “Populism starts at the 
point where popular-democratic elements are presented 
as an antagonistic option against the ideology of the 
dominant block.” Models that support stronger forms of 
participation (even the most maximalist versions) do not 
aim for the (symbolic) annihilation of elite roles, but try to 
transform these roles in order to allow for power-sharing 
between privileged and non-privileged (or elite and 
non-elite) actors. For instance, the positions that defend 
strong forms of media participation do not necessarily 
focus on the elimination of the media professional (or 
the journalist), but attempt to diversify and open up this 
societal identity so that the processes and outcomes of 
media production do not remain the privileged territory 
of media professionals and media industries. 
(v) Participation is invitational. Even the contem-
porary maximalist participatory models only rarely aim 
to impose participation. Their necessary embeddedness 
in a democratic culture protects against a post-political 
reduction of participation to a mere technique, but also 
against the enforcement of participation. Here, I concur 
with Foss and Griffin (1995, p. 3), who contrast invitation 
and persuasion (the latter being fed by the “desire for con-
trol and domination”), and Greiner and Singhal (2009, p. 
34), who develop the concept of invitational social change, 
which “seek[s] to substitute interventions which inform 
with calls to imagine and efforts to inspire”. These kinds 
of reflections allow participation to be seen as invitational, 
which implies that the enforcement of participation is 
defined as contradictory to the logics of participation, 
and that the right not to participate should be respected. 
(vi) Participation is not the same as access and interac-
tion. Arguably, these notions are still very different – in 
their theoretical origins and in their respective meanings. 
But they are often integrated (or conflated) into defini-
tions of participation. One example here is Melucci’s 
(1989, p. 174) definition, when he says that participation 
has a double meaning: “It means both taking part, that 
is, acting so as to promote the interests and the needs 
of an actor as well as belonging to a system, identifying 
with the ‘general interests’ of the community”. Another 
example of this conflation10 can be found in Convergence 
Culture where Jenkins (2006, p. 305) defines participation 
as referring “to the social and cultural interactions that 
occur around media”. Yet another example can be found 
in Taylor and Willis’s (1999, p. 215) introductory sen-
tences to their chapter on Public Participation in the 1990s: 
“Broadly, three different models of audience participation 
can be identified in the non-fiction media. First11, there 
has been a wide increase in the use of audience interaction 
‘segments’ on television.”
However valuable these approaches and analyses 
are, I would like to argue that participation is structurally 
different from access and interaction and that a negative-
relationist strategy – distinguishing between these three 
concepts – helps to clarify the meaning(s) of participation. 
A considerable number of academic disciplines, including 
communication and media studies, have become insensi-
tive towards the need to properly define participation, 
which implies that audience practices like watching 
television, surfing on the web, visiting a museum, talking 
to a neighbour, pressing the red button to initiate the 
interactive functions of digital television are all deemed 
necessarily participatory activities. This over-stretched 
approach towards participation causes the link with 
the main defining component of participation, namely 
power, being obscured. Moreover, the over-stretching of 
participation often causes the more maximalist meanings 
of participation to remain hidden12. 
Access and interaction do matter for participa-
tory processes in the media – they are actually its condi-
tions of possibility – but they are also very distinct from 
participation because of their less explicit emphasis on 
power dynamics and decision-making. Here, especially 
Pateman’s (1970, p. 70-71) definition of participation, 
which refers to influence or (even) equal power relations in 
decision-making processes, is useful to avoid the signifier 
participation being over-stretched. Taking this definition 
and the here discussed characteristics of participation as 
starting point; we can develop a model that distinguishes 
between access, interaction and participation.
10 It should be added that Jenkins does distinguish between interactivity and participation ( Jenkins, 2006: 305), and that (in some 
rare cases) he uses the concepts of participation and interaction alongside each other, leaving some room for the idea that they are 
different concepts ( Jenkins, 2006, p. 110, 137)
11 The other two modes they distinguish are programmes that entirely consist of audience participation and programmes that are 
centred on a live studio audience.
12 From this perspective, the conflation of access, interaction and participation is actually part of the struggle between the minimalist 
and maximalist articulations of participation.
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Access, interaction and 
participation (AIP)
If we revisit the theoretical discussions on par-
ticipation, we can find numerous layers of meanings that 
can be attributed to the three concepts. This diversity of 
meanings can be used to relate the three concepts to each 
other and to flesh out of the distinctions between them. 
All three concepts can then be situated in a model, which 
is termed the AIP-model (see Figure 113). First, through 
this negative-relationist strategy, access becomes articu-
lated as presence, in a variety of ways that are related to 
four areas: technology, content, people and organizations. 
For instance, in the case of digital divide discourse, the 
focus is placed on the access to media technologies (and 
more specifically ICTs), which in turn allows people to 
access media content. In both cases, access implies achiev-
ing presence (to technology or media content). Access 
also features in the more traditional media feedback dis-
cussions, where it has yet another meaning. Here, access 
implies gaining a presence within media organizations, 
which generates the opportunity for people to have their 
voices heard (in providing feedback). If we focus more on 
media production, access still plays a key role in describ-
ing the presence of media (production) technology, and 
13 See Carpentier (2007) for an earlier version of the AIP model.
Figure 1. Access, interaction and participation – The AIP model.
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of media organizations and other people to (co-)produce 
and distribute the content.
The second concept, interaction, has a long his-
tory in sociological theory, where it often refers to the 
establishment of socio-communicative relationships. 
Subjectivist sociologies, such as symbolic interactionism 
and phenomenological sociology, highlight the impor-
tance of social interaction in the construction of meaning 
through lived and intersubjective experiences embodied 
in language. In these sociologies the social is shaped by 
actors interacting on the basis of shared interests, purposes 
and values, or common knowledge.14 Although interac-
tion is often equated with participation, I here want to 
distinguish between these two concepts, as this distinction 
allows an increase in the focus on power and (formal or 
informal) decision-making in the definition of participa-
tion, and – as mentioned before – protecting the more 
maximalist approaches to participation. 
If interaction is seen as the establishment of socio-
communicative relationships within the media sphere, 
there are again a variety of ways that these relationships 
can be established. First, in the categorizations that some 
authors (Hoffman and Novak, 1996; Lee, 2000) have de-
veloped in order to deal with the different components of 
Human-Computer Interaction, different types of interac-
tion have been distinguished. Through these categoriza-
tions the audience-to-audience interaction component 
(strengthened later by analyses of co-creation) has been 
developed, in combination with the audience-to-(media) 
technology component. At the production level this refers 
to the interaction with media technology and people to 
(co-)produce content, possibly within organizational 
contexts. A set of other components can be found within 
the ‘old’ media studies approaches. The traditional active 
audience models have contributed to this debate through 
their focus on the interaction between audience and con-
tent, which relates to the selection and interpretation of 
content. As these processes are not always individualized, 
but sometimes collective, also forms of media consump-
tion like family or public viewing (Hartmann, 2008) can 
be included, not to forget the role that interpretative 
communities can play (Radway, 1988; Lindlof, 1988).
This then brings me to the concept of participa-
tion. As repeatedly argued, this difference between par-
ticipation on the one hand, and access and interaction on 
the other is located within the key role that is attributed 
to power, and to equal(ized) power relations in decision-
making processes. Furthermore, the distinction between 
content-related participation and structural participation 
can then be used to point to different spheres of decision-
making. First, there are decision-making processes 
related to media content production, which might also 
involve other people and (proto-)machines, and which 
might take place within the context of media organiza-
tions. Second, there is the structural participation in the 
management and policies of media organizations; also 
technology-producing organizations can be added in 
this model, allowing for the inclusion of practices that 
can be found in, for instance, the free software and open 
source movement(s). At the level of reception, many of 
the processes are categorized as interaction, but as there 
are still (implicit) decision-making processes and power 
dynamics involved, the reception sphere should still be 
mentioned here as well, although the main emphasis is 
placed on the production sphere.
Conclusion
Participation is not a fixed notion, but is deeply 
embedded within our political realities and thus is the 
object of long-lasting and intense ideological struggles. The 
search for harmonious theoretical frameworks to capture 
contemporary realities might have been an important 
fantasy of the homo academicus, but also it might not do the 
analysis of these realities any favours. This does not mean 
that conceptual contingency needs to be celebrated and 
radicalized; after all, “a discourse incapable of generating 
any fixity of meaning is the discourse of the psychotic” 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 112). It requires careful 
manoeuvring to reconcile the conceptual contingency with 
the necessary fixity that protects the concept of participa-
tion from signifying anything and everything. But still, at 
some point participation simply stops being participation.
Through a more detailed reading of the articula-
tions of participation in (maximalist) democratic theory, 
participation’s crucial and intimate connection with 
power (and the societal redistribution of power) becomes 
emphasized. Moreover, participation’s embeddedness in 
a democratic logic allows us to avoid two key problems: 
14 I do not want to claim that power plays no role in interactionist theory, but power and especially decision-making processes do 
not feature as prominently as they do in the democratic-participatory theories that provide the basis for this book.
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the democratic-populist fallacy, where the myth of total 
equalization rears its ugly head, and the repressive version 
of participation, where participation is enforced. But the 
main theoretical strategy used in this article to clarify 
participation’s contemporary discursive limits is negative-
relationist. In this negative-relationist strategy, concepts 
are defined through their juxtaposition to other concepts. 
In the case of participation, it is seen as structurally dif-
ferent from interaction and access. Access and interaction 
remain important conditions of possibility of participa-
tion, but they cannot be equated with participation. The 
concept of access is based on presence, in many different 
forms: for instance, presence in an organizational struc-
ture or a community, or presence within the operational 
reach of media production technologies. Interaction is 
a second condition of possibility, which emphasizes the 
social-communicative relationship that is established, with 
other humans or objects. Although these relationships 
have a power dimension, this dimension is not translated 
into a decision-making process. My argument here is 
that, through this juxtaposition to access and interaction, 
participation becomes defined as a political – in the broad 
meaning of the concept of the political – process where 
the actors involved in decision-making processes are po-
sitioned towards each other through power relationships 
that are (to an extent) egalitarian.
The qualification ‘to an extent’ reintroduces the 
notion of struggle because the political struggle over 
participation is focused precisely on the equality and bal-
anced nature of these power relationships. Participation 
is defined through these negative logics – distinguishing 
it from access and interaction – which demarcates the 
discursive field of action, where the struggle for different 
participatory intensities is being waged. This is also where 
the distinction between minimalist and maximalist forms 
of participation emerges: While minimalist participation 
is characterized by the existence of strong power imbal-
ances between the actors (without participation being 
completely annihilated or reduced to interaction or access), 
maximalist participation is characterized by the equaliza-
tion of power relations, approximating Pateman’s (1970) 
concept of full participation. Although maximalist par-
ticipation – seen as equalized power relations in decision-
making – has proven to be very difficult to translate into 
social practice, we should be careful not to erase it from 
the academic agenda of participation research because of 
mere carelessness.
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